Dave, your problem seems to be that you sincerely trust governments to do the right thing. You need to learn to be a little more skeptical. The following is a good example of why:
"Norman Cousins - best known for his book Anatomy of an Illness - also wrote The Pathology of Power:
"The attachment to total power in our time not only has not served the purposes of national security but threatens to bring about a basic change in the kind of balanced relationship between government and people that is the central feature in the political architecture of the American Constitution-makers. No aspect of this threat is more apparent than the way genuine national security requirements have been allowed to serve as the occasion for an assault on the wealth of the American people. The chapters that follow summarize the reports of public and private investigators - reports documenting the loss amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, through waste, bribery, kickbacks, circumvention of competitive bidding, flawed weapons systems, and sheer incompetence in the military program."
Cousins tells the story of "the M-16: a rifle that couldn't." He describes how the Vietcong, after winning a firefight, would strip the dead American bodies of "everything useful - boots, canteens, knives, grenades, rations, and so on. Even relatively outmoded rifles of World War II were eagerly snatched up. Yet the Vietcong disdained the M-16s, leaving them behind on the ground." Cousins then quotes from an article on the M-16 by James Fallows in the June 1981 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. The article includes quotes from various letters from American infantry soldiers in Vietnam:
"Our M-16s aren't worth much... Out of 40 rounds I've fired, my rifle jammed about 10 times... These rifles are getting a lot of guys killed because they jam so easily... " "The weapon has failed us at crucial moments... as many as 50 percent of the rifles fail to work." "During this fight... I lost some of my best buddies. I personally checked their weapons. Close to 70 percent had a round stuck in the chamber, and take my word it was not their fault."
Cousins then describes the development of the M-16, which started with the M-14 rifle. The M-14 had a major drawback in that its recoil during automatic fire was so violent that it bucked and jolted, and was difficult to aim. Weapons designer Eugene Stoner invented the AR-15 rifle as a solution. It was manufactured by the Armelite Corporation. It fired high-impact .22-caliber bullets, and was much lighter than the M-14 which used .30-caliber bullets. As a result a soldier with an AR-15 could carry three times as much ammunition as one with an M-14. The AR-15 was virtually jam-proof. It was a dream weapon. The Green Berets and the paratroopers requested and got them.
But in the early 1960s the Army Material Command falsified tests to "prove" that the M-14 was superior to the AR-15. They blocked the general issuance of the AR-15. The top brass considered Armelite an "outside" company. The Army ordinance "experts" decided to redesign the AR-15. Among other "bells and whistles," they introduced a new pattern of spiral grooving in the barrel. They changed the gunpowder in the ammunition. The end-result was a disaster, called the M-16 rifle. It overheated and jammed, both in tests and on the battlefield. In 1967 the House Armed Services Committee investigated the M-16. Their verdict included that "The failure... of officials with authority in the Army to... correct the deficiencies... borders on criminal negligence."
Cousins also writes:
"In 1966, [Rear Admiral Gene] La Rocque was asked by the secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze, to head a task force of ten senior officers
to study the Vietnam War and make recommendations for action. The question put to them: "What should the U.S. do?"
The team went to Vietnam.
"We looked at all the options for completing the war, "La Rocque recalled. "It became obvious that we were wasting kids without really knowing why. There were no real goals. And that was what I told General [William] Westmoreland, 'You're spending $90,000 a day... and you don't really know why.'" After nine months of research, the group concluded that there was no way they could win the war in Vietnam, and advised Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara accordingly."
These are just two samples from three pages of Cousins's book.
From:
http://www.buildfreedom.com/tl/rape9.shtml